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Building on Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton and Tom Ginsburg’s call for more social 
science research in international law, this Essay discusses ways in which social science research 
can be applied to inform reforms of international institutions.  In the face of significant challenges 
to the current international legal order, active reform discussions have been ongoing concerning a 
number of international institutions. This Essay posits that in developing proposals to reform 
these international institutions, more attention should be paid to identify the causes of existing 
problems, which is important in an international setting where decision-making requires the 
consensus of multiple stakeholders. The social science approach can be useful in this regard. Using 
investor-state dispute settlement as an example, this Essay discusses how the social science 
approach can be applied to help understand the causes of the problem of excessive duration and 
costs of investor-state arbitration proceedings. Findings from social science research highlight the 
importance of mechanisms which insulate respondent state decision makers from domestic political 
pressure.  These mechanisms deserve more attention in ongoing ISDS reform discussions.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
After a period of robust growth with the creation of a significant number of 
new international courts and tribunals, international law has now come to a phase 
of backlashes and recalibration. Several African countries have withdrawn from 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) amid criticism of the court’s bias against 
African countries.1 One of the rallying points during the Brexit campaign was the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU’s) jurisdiction over the United 
Kingdom, jurisdiction which has come to an end following the finalization of 
Brexit.2 Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have 
withdrawn from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) Convention after a series of claims being filed by foreign investors against 
these countries at ICSID.3 Other countries have, en masse, terminated the bilateral 
investment treaties into which they entered. 4  Even the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) dispute settlement system, which was once viewed as the 
“crown jewel” of the WTO, has now become partially paralyzed because of the 
United States’ continuous objections to the reappointment of Appellate Body 
Members.5 
In the meantime, countries are actively engaging in discussions of reforming 
international courts and tribunals. More than forty-five countries are participating 
in discussions of possible reforms of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
under the auspices of Working Group III of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 6  Major WTO member countries also 
agree that the system needs reform and have started dialogues on this topic.7 
 
1  South Africa: Withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
CN.786.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 25, 2016); Burundi: Withdrawal from Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. C.N.805.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 28, 2016); 
Gambia: Withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
C.N.862.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Nov. 11, 2016).  
2  Eleanor Bennett, UK Government Trumpets Renewed ‘Control of Our Laws’ and End of ECJ Jurisdiction 
After Making EU Brexit Deal, JURIST (Dec. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/ZDG4-L363. 
3  Matthew Weiniger, Christian Leathley & Joanne Greenaway, Venezuela Follows Bolivia and Ecuador 
with Plans to Denounce ICSID Convention, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 19, 2012), https://perma.cc/RSE4-7CU4. 
4  Kavaljit Singh & Burghard Ilge, India Overhauls Its Investment Treaty Regime, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 15, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/GPR7-BNHU; see also Ben Bland & Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More 
than 60 Bilateral Investment Treaties, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), https://perma.cc/BVQ4-PUKR. 
5  Cosette Creamer, From the WTO’s Crown Jewel to Its Crown of Thorns, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 51, 51 
(2019). 
6  Julian Arato, ISDS Reform: Working Group III Gets Down to Brass Tacks, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG 
(Oct. 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/7KEZ-H29J.  
7  Isabelle Icso, USTR Nominee on the WTO: U.S. ‘Can’t Afford’ Continued Disengagement, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (Feb. 26, 2021), https://perma.cc/3QLV-P2HD; Hannah Monicken, EU Moves Closer to 
U.S. on Appellate Body, Other WTO Reforms In New Strategy, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Feb. 18, 2021), 
https://perma.cc/U4L7-B7UB. 
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Other international courts such as the ICC and CJEU have also been the subject 
of reform proposals propelled by criticism against these institutions.8 
As Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg note in their article, the evolution of 
scholarship on international law has always been influenced by real-world 
problems.9 While earlier literature takes a largely theoretical approach to studying 
problems arising from international law practice, in the past two decades, there 
has been an empirical turn in international law scholarship.10 Nevertheless, until 
recently, this line of empirical research has been largely motivated by high-level 
questions from prior theoretical debates, such as how international law is 
produced and whether international law matters.11 While empirically assessing 
these issues can have implications for larger normative questions, it often does 
not speak directly to which normative prescriptions should be adopted to address 
real-world problems in international law. 
This Essay argues that the backlash international law is currently facing, and 
the ongoing reforms of international institutions underscore the need for more 
social science research that is geared toward examining the causes of existing 
institutional problems. Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg describe social science 
research as identifying a research question, developing a specific hypothesis that 
can be empirically assessed, identifying a research design and data to assess the 
validity of the hypothesis, and presenting results while acknowledging the 
assumptions upon which they are based and the level of uncertainty associated 
with those results.12 Building on their framework, this Essay proposes that to help 
inform the reform of various international institutions, more social science 
research should approach an existing institutional problem by asking which 
factors may have caused the problem, generating testable hypotheses based on a 
potential cause, and developing a research design that allows one to draw causal 
inferences about the effect of this cause. 
Understanding the causes of a problem helps inform more tailored 
institutional reforms that specifically address these underlying causes. This is 
particularly important in the context of reforms of international legal institutions 
because of the wide variety of stakeholders. For example, during the ISDS reform 
discussions at UNCITRAL Working Group III, while countries generally agreed 
that the existing ISDS system needs reform, their positions diverged considerably 
 
8  Douglas Guilfoyle, Reforming the International Criminal Court: Is It Time for the Assembly of State Parties to 
Be the Adults in the Room?, EJIL: TALK! (May 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/CYS3-4RGQ. 
9  Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International Law, 22 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2021). 
10  Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 1 (2012). 
11  See id. at 2–3, 12. 
12  Abebe et al., supra note 9, at 12–13.  
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as to which reforms to pursue.13 After multiple rounds of discussions over the 
past three years, countries have identified six major areas of concerns over ISDS: 
“excessive costs, excessive duration of proceedings, lack of consistency in legal 
interpretation, incorrectness of decisions, lack of arbitral diversity, and lack of 
independence, impartiality, and neutrality of ISDS adjudicators.”14 With respect to 
each of these concerns, the Working Group has put forward various reform 
options.15 Countries have expressed divergent views on these options and have 
yet to reach consensus on the adoption of any reforms.16 Social science research 
that clearly identifies the causes of existing problems will help facilitate consensus 
building amongst countries and provide guidance in terms of which reform option 
may be best suited to address a particular problem. Indeed, each reform option 
comes with its own trade-offs.17 This makes it even more important to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of the existing problem first, instead of rushing to 
implement reforms that may not get at the real causes of the problem. 
As Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg note in their article, social science research 
is pluralistic in methods. 18  Both qualitative and quantitative methods can be 
instrumental in enhancing our understanding about the causes of a particular 
problem in the study of international law. However, the emphasis of these two 
types of methods is slightly different. Qualitative methods are more often applied 
to locate the potential causes of a problem, whereas quantitative methods are 
more often applied to assess the effect of a particular causal factor.19 For example, 
one may conduct interviews to understand what has caused a particular problem 
and, on the other hand, apply a reduced-form analysis using observational data to 
identify the effect of a potential cause. Social scientists should embrace the use of 
both methods and, as Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg suggest in their article, pick 
the method most appropriate to the problem at hand.20  
In applying quantitative methods to the study of international law, one major 
challenge is causal identification. International law, by its nature, is influenced by 
various forces working together. It can be difficult to tease out the effect of a 
 
13  Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systematic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, 112 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 410, 414–15 (2018).  
14  Daniel Behn, Malcolm Langford & Laura Letourneau-Tremblay, Empirical Perspectives on Investment 
Arbitration: What Do We Know? Does It Matter?, 21 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 188, 190 (2020). 
15  Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., 
https://perma.cc/DKT7-A97T.  
16  See id. 
17  Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 
112 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 361 (2018). 
18  Abebe et al., supra note 9, at 4. 
19  See Hebert Smith, Effects of Causes and Causes of Effects, Some Remarks from the Sociological Side, 43 SOCIO. 
METHODS & RSCH. 406, 409 (2014).  
20  See Abebe et al., supra note 9, at 15–17. 
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particular factor in a clean manner. In addition, unlike studies evaluating policy 
merits or effectiveness in the domestic setting that can leverage variations at the 
jurisdictional level (for example, a difference in differences study examining the 
employment effect of minimum wage increases in New Jersey versus 
Pennsylvania), it is difficult for international law scholars to find such variations 
to figure out whether a policy or institutional option is desirable or not, as 
international law is meant to be international and universal. 
That said, this does not mean causal identification is impossible in the study 
of international law. As Shaffer and Ginsburg pointed out almost a decade ago, 
empirical work in international law should be guided by conditional international 
law theory, which focuses on the conditions under which international law is 
produced and has effects.21 One empirical strategy for conditional international 
law theory is to leverage variations in the contexts in which international law 
operates, such as variations in the underlying treaty provisions, in the legal claims 
advanced during dispute settlement, and in the international law participants 
themselves. With the increased availability of fine-grained international law data 
and the development in identification strategies, one can employ a research design 
that exploits variations in the aforementioned dimensions to draw causal 
inferences in studying questions related to existing problems, such as why certain 
countries chose to terminate the international investment treaties they signed or 
what has led to prolonged proceedings in ISDS and WTO dispute settlement.  
Importantly, one should always be clear about the assumptions being made 
and any limitations associated with the methodology or results. Because 
international law actors may not be familiar with sophisticated statistical methods, 
transparency on methodology and caution against overclaiming can help alleviate 
potential concerns about the credibility of the results.  
The challenges of causal inferences in the international law context make it 
important to combine quantitative analysis with qualitative methods which 
contribute to the development of theories guiding quantitative research and 
provide valuable insights where quantitative methods have limitations.  Another 
area that awaits more future work is the replication of prior research findings, 
which will generate more confidence that reform proposals made on the basis of 
existing social science research are, in fact, supported by robust empirical evidence. 
In the remainder of this Essay, I use the excessive duration and costs 
problem of ISDS proceedings as an example to discuss how social science 
research may be applied to explore causes of a problem and shed light on potential 
solutions. 
 
21  Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 1.  
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II.  SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE EXCESSIVE 
DURATION AND COSTS PROBLEM OF ISDS 
ISDS is a dispute settlement mechanism that allows foreign investors to 
bring claims against sovereign states before arbitral tribunals for alleged violations 
of the latter’s investment protection obligations. ISDS has long been criticized for 
its lengthy and costly proceedings.22 According to UNCITRAL, an average ISDS 
case lasts for approximately 3.75 years, which translates into average litigation and 
arbitration costs of millions of dollars for each side of the dispute.23 The excessive 
length (and relatedly, excessive costs) of investor-state arbitration, which was 
designed to be a cost- and time-effective dispute settlement system, has given rise 
to wide criticism from countries participating in the process.24 However, while 
there has been a recent increase in empirical research documenting this problem,25 
few studies have empirically examined the causes of the excessive duration and 
costs problem. 26  Different diagnoses of the causes may point to different 
prescriptions to address the problem. In particular, if one cause for prolonged 
proceedings is that countries are unwilling to settle cases because of domestic 
political pressure, then perhaps more institutional reform efforts should be 
focused on dispute prevention and mitigation at the domestic level rather than 
case management reforms or other procedural changes at the international level. 
In a new article, I examine this potential cause by exploring the influence of 
domestic political pressure on state settlement behavior in ISDS cases. 27 The 
overall settlement rate in ISDS is much lower than what is typical in other litigation 
settings—only around twenty percent of all concluded ISDS cases were settled.28 
News reports and surveys of ISDS practitioners show that states are averse to 
settlement, which tends to generate public criticism for capitulating to the 
demands of foreign investors and “selling out” using public money.29 In a 2018 
 
22  See generally SUSAN D. FRANCK, ARBITRATION COSTS: MYTHS AND REALITIES IN INVESTMENT 
TREATY ARBITRATION (2019). 
23  Secretariat, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
— Cost and Duration: Note by the Secretariat, ¶¶ 48, 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.153 (Aug. 
31, 2018). 
24  FRANCK, supra note 22, at 181–84. 
25  See, e.g., José Manuel Álvarez Zárate et al., Duration of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Proceedings, 21 J. 
WORLD INV. & TRADE 300, 303–04 (2020).  
26  For an exception, see Behn et al., supra note 14, at 18–21. 
27  Weijia Rao, Domestic Politics and Settlement in Investor-State Arbitration, J. LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming). 
28  Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, INV. POL’Y HUB, https://perma.cc/L989-QYAN (last updated 
Jul. 31, 2020).  
29  See, e.g., Bette Hileman, Canada Capitulates on MMT, Settles with Ethyl, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS (Jul. 27, 
1998), https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/cen-v076n030.p013a; Uchenna Awom & Patience 
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survey of ninety-seven experienced practitioners and government officials who 
have participated in ISDS proceedings, the most frequently mentioned obstacle 
to settlement in investor-state disputes was the desire to shift the blame to a third-
party adjudicator, so that the government would not have to take responsibility 
for compensating foreign investors with public money. 30  These qualitative 
findings suggest that domestic political pressure may have caused respondent 
states to delay settlement or forego settlement opportunities altogether, which has 
the effect of substantially extending the length of arbitration proceedings. 
To identify the effect of anticipated domestic public pressure on case 
settlement, I exploit variation in election timing in the respondent states and use 
it as a proxy for the government’s sensitivity to domestic public pressure. Electoral 
disapproval is more likely to translate into loss of political power as elections 
approach. Hence, elected officials likely become increasingly cautious with settling 
with foreign investors in the run-up to elections. On the other hand, the time left 
until the next election should be exogenous to case quality. Thus, the research 
design allows one to draw causal inferences about the effects of domestic political 
pressure on state settlement decisions. 
In the article, I find that a state becomes less likely to settle an ISDS case as 
it gets closer to the next election of the state leader. This finding suggests that 
state settlement decisions in ISDS are not made solely based on case merits.  
Instead, case settlement also appears to be affected by a political calculus which 
fluctuates based on election timing. Such political influence leads to delay, and in 
cases where domestic political pressure is high enough, a failure to settle. This 
corroborates prior qualitative findings and points to domestic political influence 
on state settlement decisions as a cause of lengthy and costly ISDS proceedings. 
This finding has direct normative implications regarding pursuing reforms 
to address the problem of excessive duration (and relatedly, excessive costs) 
associated with ISDS proceedings. UNCITRAL has identified several possible 
measures to address concerns about excessive duration and costs, including 
promotion of dispute prevention and mitigation policies, implementing stricter 
timelines, adding new procedural rules to prevent disputing parties from delaying 
the process, establishing advisory centers to provide legal advice to countries, and 
providing arbitrators with case management training. 31  A majority of these 
measures aim to shorten case duration and reduce associated costs through 
 
Akpuru, Nigeria: Malabu Deal Latest—Shell’s Dirty Lies, ALLAFRICA (May 24, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/D7DH-HN4U; Seraphina Chew, Lucy Reed & J Christopher Thomas, Report: 
Survey on Obstacles to Settlement of Investor-State Disputes 1 (NUS Ctr. for Int’l L. Working Paper, Paper 
No. 2018/022, 2018), https://perma.cc/8V28-SEUS. 
30  Chew et al., supra note 29, at 12. 
31  Secretariat, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., supra note 23, ¶ 101. 
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reforming various procedural aspects of ISDS.32  While such procedural reform 
efforts can be valuable, the finding that countries’ settlement decisions are affected 
by domestic political pressure highlights the importance of mechanisms that 
insulate respondent state decision makers in ISDS proceedings from such 
domestic political pressure. Without such mechanisms in place, even if reforms 
are made to improve case management and streamline the proceedings, case 
duration and costs may not be substantially reduced when domestic political 
pressure forces respondent states to continue litigation without settlement.  
One way to insulate settlement decision makers from domestic political 
pressure is to delegate the decision-making power to a specialized agency or 
commission and have legal experts there issue detailed reports to explain the 
reasoning behind the settlement decision, illustrating why settlement is the 
desirable strategy in a particular case. These legal experts should be less susceptible 
to domestic political pressure as compared to politicians, and collective decision 
may further relieve them of concerns about potential repercussions from the 
domestic public. An expert report with detailed reasoning also helps elected 
officials justify the settlement decision to domestic audiences, which can mitigate 
potential domestic backlash against settlement with foreign investors. 
A few Latin American countries have already established mechanisms 
serving similar purposes. 33  Peru, for example, established an inter-agency 
commission, Coordination and Response System for International Investment 
Disputes (SICRECI), which specializes in the prevention and handling of 
investor-state disputes.34 Among other things, this commission is responsible for 
“assessing the possibility of reaching a settlement in the direct negotiation stage 
and participating in these negotiations.” 35  The work of the commission is 
supported by a Technical Secretariat, whose core functions include “conducting 
an initial assessment of the dispute and preparing a preliminary report that is 
submitted to the other members; preparing reports on courses of action and 
strategies and any other information necessary for the Commission to perform its 
 
32  Addressing concerns about time and costs through procedural reforms has also been the focus of 
ICSID’s ongoing rules amendment project. See Meg Kinnear, Continuity and Change in the ICSID 
System: Challenges and Opportunities in the Search for Consensus, https://perma.cc/98ZQ-
3CPA. 
33  See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES 
TO ARBITRATION, at 86, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11, U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.11 
(2010) https://perma.cc/66C3-NCES.  
34  Ricardo Ampuero Llerena, Peru’s State Coordination and Response System for International Investment 
Disputes, INV. TREATY NEWS (Jan. 14, 2013), https://perma.cc/WK9T-56WR.
 
35  See id. 
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duties.”36 In addition, the commission also works closely with the Peruvian entities 
responsible for concluding investment agreements to impose new requirements 
on foreign investors. Under these new requirements, investors have to present 
detailed information about the dispute at the time of dispute notification, so as to 
“facilitate the complete and full understanding of the dispute by the Special 
Commission . . . [to] increase the possibility of achieving a satisfactory outcome 
in the negotiation stage.”37 
By requiring legal experts in the Special Commission to issue reports 
detailing the reasoning for the litigation (or settlement) strategies, based on all of 
the available information about the dispute, these institutional arrangements have 
the potential of insulating the decision makers from domestic political pressure so 
that they can make settlement decisions based on case merits rather than political 
whims. In this way, more cases, which otherwise would not be settled due to 
intense domestic political pressure, will be settled, likely at earlier stages of the 
dispute.  Indeed, Peru credits its system with averting around 300 potential 
arbitration proceedings. 38   The facilitation of early settlement (when it is 
demonstrated to be more desirable than litigation) relieves respondent states of 
the burden of spending considerable public funds and resources defending 
investor claims, therefore contributing to the reduction of duration and costs of 
ISDS proceedings. 
Another mechanism that may serve similar purposes is to have a third party 
independently assess the facts of a dispute and issue a report of its fact findings, 
upon which respondent state governments can rely to make settlement decisions. 
In this regard, ICSID’s most recent rules amendment proposals contain a stand-
alone set of rules for fact-finding, which offer states and investors the opportunity 
to constitute a committee to make objective findings of fact that could resolve 
their dispute.39 Reports resulting from these fact-finding proceedings can provide 
basis for respondent state governments’ settlement decisions and therefore 
alleviate their concerns about domestic backlash (to the extent that the report 
implies settlement is likely more desirable than litigation). Of course, strict time 
limits need to be imposed so that the fact-finding will not become another costly 
and drawn-out process itself. 
 
36  Id.; see also U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., BEST PRACTICES IN INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: 
HOW TO PREVENT AND MANAGE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: LESSONS FROM PERU, at 35 (2011) 
https://perma.cc/5H2H-7JGG. 
37  See Llerena, supra note 34.    
38  See Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 118 (2013). 
39  ICSID, Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules Working Paper 4 (2020), 193–204, 
https://perma.cc/9NXJ-DLNS.   
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III.  SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND OTHER ASPECTS OF 
ISDS  REFORM  
The social science approach can be extended to study a broader range of 
problems in the international investment law sphere that are pertinent to ongoing 
ISDS reform discussions. For example, many critics consider the recent explosion 
of ISDS cases to be a major factor in contributing to a number of countries’ 
terminations of bilateral investment treaties. 40  Countries learn about the 
consequences of their treaty commitments through their experiences in ISDS 
disputes, which propels them to terminate these treaties.41 This has brought a lot 
of blame and controversy to ISDS, which is now at the center of a legitimacy crisis. 
However, an alternative or additional cause of the problem may be that these 
countries did not carefully negotiate the terms of these treaties and, as a result, are 
more likely to renege on their prior commitments. These two causes implicate 
different reform options to address the problem. While one suggests that more 
should be done to improve the fairness and quality of ISDS decisions, which is 
what most reform proposals in the area have centered on so far, the other points 
to the importance of having countries spend more effort and use more expertise 
in negotiating treaties. More social science research on this issue will help redirect 
reform efforts to needed places. 
As another example, also in the context of ISDS reform, while countries 
share concerns over lack of impartiality and independence among arbitrators, their 
views diverge when it comes to deciding which reforms to pursue to address this 
problem. Some countries advocate for an overhaul of the ISDS system by 
replacing investor-state arbitration with a multilateral investment court, whereas 
other countries favor retaining the existing system but instituting more 
incremental reforms that redress these specific concerns.42 More social science 
research on what causes biased decisions can help provide states with a clearer 
picture regarding which path to pursue. For instance, if there is no evidence that 
reappointment incentives per se, which are inherent to ad hoc appointment—the 
defining feature of arbitration—lead to biased decisions, then perhaps more 
incremental reforms, such as refining the arbitrator’s code of conduct, address the 
problem better than a systematic overhaul does.43 
 
40  See Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, When Do States Renegotiate Investment Agreements? The 
Impact of Arbitration, 13 REV. INT’L ORG. 25, 33 (2018). 
41  See id. 
42  See Roberts, supra note 13, at 411. 
43  See Weijia Rao, Are Arbitrators Biased in ICSID Arbitration? A Dynamic Perspective, 66 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. (forthcoming 2021). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION  
In a time when international law is facing significant challenges and 
undergoing rapid changes, Abebe, Chilton, and Ginsburg’s call for more social 
science research in the field is timely and important. The social science research 
on international law has so far largely focused on documenting existing problems 
and examining high-level theoretical questions. This Essay posits that to inform 
reforms of international institutions, more social science research should be 
focused on identifying the causes of these problems and proposing policies or 
reforms that specifically address those underlying causes. This requires us to 
explore new frontiers of the conditional international law theory and exploit 
variations in both the substance of international law and international law 
participants. In an international setting where decision-making requires the 
consensus of a wide range of stakeholders, obtaining a comprehensive 
understanding of what caused existing problems is both important and necessary 
for implementing tailored reforms that help the field of international law 
overcome challenges at a pivotal time. 
